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Jeremy Bentham on open government and privacy 
Colin Tyler 
“Tyranny would be banished from the earth, could it but once be sufficiently known” 
(Bentham 1983b, p.386 [IX.20.A12])1 
1. Introduction 
Jeremy Bentham wears many faces. He wears one face as the founder of Philosophic 
Radicalism and the intellectual inspiration behind the early career of John Stuart Mill (Mill 
1838). In this guise, Bentham was one of the most important social and political figures of 
the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. For some people, he was the advocate 
of a crude and unrealistic form of hedonistic utilitarianism, while yet others see him as the 
guiding force behind some of the most significant improvements in British public 
infrastructure, such as prison reform and city sanitation programmes. Yet, the ridicule that 
Bentham heaped on the doctrine of natural rights is one of the most famous aspects of his 
thought and for many readers of Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, he is known as a 
defender of the contemporary surveillance state. Yet, he is also known among a smaller 
group of scholars as a radical democrat and a fervent defender of open government, even if 
his views on privacy and personal freedom are much less widely known. 
 Two of Bentham’s faces appear on his two heads. One head is a waxwork model 
which sits on top of his “auto-icon”. This commemoration of himself and his thought was 
the effigy that he ordered to be constructed from his preserved skin and skeleton. He 
                                                          
1 I am pleased to thank Alistair Duff, Oliver Harris, Bhikhu Parekh, Chris Riley and Philip Schofield for 
their assistance with this paper. The usual disclaimer applies. References to Bentham 1983b give the 
page number plus the numbers for chapter, section, and article. 
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ordered it to be posed in a seated position in his favourite clothes and with his favourite 
walking stick, which can be found now in the South Cloister of University College London 
(UCL). The other head is his real head, also preserved, which usually sits in a UCL vault 
following its theft several years ago by students of the King’s College London, but which on 
special occasions sits between his feet behind the glass of the cabinet in which his auto-icon 
resides. 
 The auto-icon is not simply a strange joke by a strange man, although it is that too. 
Rather, the auto-icon is Bentham’s attempt to debunk the socially-harmful prejudices that 
surrounded corpses in the early nineteenth-century, and in particular to debunk the then-
Christian notion of the literal resurrection of the body on the Day of Judgement. The 
attempt was characteristic of the man because Bentham was an enlightenment figure. That 
is, he strove to replace obscurity, prejudice and myth with reason and evidence-based 
knowledge. Bentham argued throughout his literary career that only by doing so could one 
begin to counter the vested interests which the rich sought to promote through their 
exercise of their inordinate power. Even his infamous panopticon was part of this project. It 
was a prison at whose heart stood a central observation tower encircled by layers of cells, 
which enabled the guards to see every corner of the prisoner’s accommodation without 
themselves being observed. As Bhikhu Parekh has noted: “It was not a metaphor for 
Bentham’s society, which was really quite liberal in several respects. And it was a cheap and 
centralized way of constructing large prisons, whose internal regime was not particularly 
harsh.” (Parekh et al 2011, p.57; see Semple 1993) In Bentham’s terms, it was part of his 
grand attempt to achieve two key aims of a good state: “Official aptitude maximized, 
expense minimized.” (Bentham 1993, p.6) 
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 This article sketches the key political dimensions of Bentham’s utilitarianism, 
focusing particularly on the central importance that he placed on freedom of information as 
a necessary condition of the effective monitoring of public officials by civil society groups 
and individual citizens. Section two outlines the critical dimensions of Bentham’s political 
theory, particularly the need to debunk metaphorical and obscure language so as to enable 
citizens to understand the real forces and interests at work in their world. Section three 
turns to his later constitutional theory, emphasising its radically-democratic elements. 
Section four focuses on Bentham’s theory of open government, emphasizing its reliance on 
public scrutiny of the actions of office-holders, a function that he assigned to what he called 
the Public Opinion Tribunal. Section five analyses the place that he ascribed to personal 
privacy through a discussion of his liberal attitude to sexual practices. Section six reflects on 
the cogency and contemporary relevance of Bentham’s theory. 
 
2. Fallacies, utilitarianism and government  
Jeremy Bentham lived from 1748 until 1832. Domestically, Britain saw rapid urbanization 
and industrialization, as well as an associated declining aristocracy. Despite these profound 
changes, the country remained custom-bound and profoundly hierarchical. Poverty, 
illiteracy, crime and disease were rife among the poor, while corruption and competing 
vested interests were rife among the rich, something that was reflected in regional and 
national government as well as in the professions, especially law, the church and medicine. 
To Bentham’s eyes, these “sinister interests” used complex, slow, expensive specialist 
languages and procedures to exclude outsiders, and to justify their privileged position 
(Bentham 1996, chapter 1, section 13n.d). 
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 The use of nonsensical concepts was not restricted to the legal, ecclesiastical or 
medical professions, however. They were central to all areas of social and political life, being 
embedded within the very language which provided the substance of these fields. Bentham 
dismissed such powerful concepts as were found in the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and the Citizen of 1791 and elsewhere, including the “social contract” and “natural 
rights”. Indeed, famously he dismissed “natural and imprescriptible rights” to “liberty, 
prosperity, security, and resistance to oppression” as “nonsense upon stilts” (Bentham 
1973, pp.267, 269). They were “anarchical fallacies” in that they were fictions which, if 
applied literally, made government impossible. Each natural right was said to possess an 
absolute authority, meaning that when they clashed with each other neither had priority 
over the other. Moreover, their absolute authority placed unassailable limits on the 
legitimate actions of the state, irrespective of the current needs of society as a whole 
(Bentham 1973, pp.269-70). In this way, such “terrorist language” (as he called it) was 
profoundly dangerous. Bentham argued that rather than appealing to what were at best 
rhetorical flourishes, society and government should be founded on clear and specific 
concepts which, when organized and employed in a rational manner, tended to serve the 
real interests of the whole community (Bentham 1973, pp.269-70). 
 Bentham developed a theory of government that would operate on the correct 
normative principles. Just as importantly, however, the government should be motivated to 
address the problems. Bentham began from the axiom that although different people value 
different things, at root every individual was motivated to seek their own pleasure and to 
avoid their own pain. He saw this fact as being profoundly important in politics, as it 
ensured that the society which the government ruled was nothing more than a collection of 
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self-interested individuals. As he wrote in his 1789 book An Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals and Legislation, 
 
“The interest of the community is one of the most general expressions that can occur in the 
phraseology of morals: no wonder that the meaning is often lost. When it has a meaning, it 
is this. The community is a fictitious body composed of the individual persons who are 
considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is, 
what? – the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it.” (Bentham 1996, 
chapter 1, section 4) 
 
On the basis of this hedonistic psychology (and not without making some rather obvious 
logical jumps), Bentham concluded that the highest value which the government should 
pursue was the maximization of net pleasure among society’s members viewed as an 
aggregate; or as he put it famously “it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that 
is the measure of right and wrong” (Bentham 1948, section 2). 
 Even though Bentham insisted on this principle for the whole of his adult life, it 
contained crucial ambiguities (Tyler 2004). For example, while he gave many examples of 
types of pleasure and pain, he never published a clear explanation of what he meant by 
these terms at the generic level (Bentham 1996, chapter 5). The closest he came to doing so 
seems to have been when he wrote in his still-unpublished manuscripts that “I call pleasure 
every sensation that a man had rather feel at that instant than feel none.  I call pain every 
sensation that a man had rather feel none than feel” (Jeremy Bentham’s unpublished 
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manuscripts, quoted in Dinwiddy 1989, p.22). There were even more fundamental problems 
for Bentham’s “greatest happiness principle”, not least the fact that it was incapable of 
producing determinate authoritative policy judgments or prescriptions because it 
established no priority between its two key variables: “the greatest happiness” and “the 
greatest number”. Should the government seek to secure the greatest happiness of, say, 
51% of the population even at the expense of the remaining 49%? Or should it seek to 
maximize the greatest possible aggregate pleasure of the whole population? 
 Bentham himself was unable to overcome these difficulties (Dinwiddy 1989, pp.25-
28). Nevertheless, he appealed to the greatest happiness principle to justify a great many 
very specific policies. In international affairs, he sought the end of slavery and colonialism, 
and argued that war should be waged only in national self-defense and as a last resort, he 
argued for the recognition of the equality of all states and called for asylum to be granted to 
all oppressed foreigners. Moreover, he used the principle as the basis of his defense of open 
government, as will become clear shortly. 
 This section has set the scene for an analysis of Bentham’s political thought. It began 
by outlining the social and political contexts in reaction to which Bentham developed his 
utilitarianism, especially the prevalence in society of sinister interests and the link that he 
saw between the power of the wealthy and the use of obscure and misleading modes of 
discourse. Finally, it highlighted some serious problems with his “greatest happiness 
principle”. Against this background, the article will sketch Bentham’s favoured constitutional 
arrangements, before analyzing the importance that he attached to open government and 
publicity. 
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3. Bentham’s constitutional theory 
The shortcomings of late-Georgian politics are so well-known that they almost do not need 
repeating. Only a tiny minority of the population could vote and almost all of that group 
were wealthy men, with many of the constituencies being rotten boroughs. Deep corruption 
was widespread throughout British society and in its imperial territories. Bentham spent 
much of his life condemning both British imperialism and British society more generally. As 
the thousands of pages of both published and unpublished writings attest, his attacks were 
not merely occasional or abstract rants. Rather, they were unrelenting attacks on both 
individual politicians, peers and other members of the gentry and business classes, but also 
detailed critiques of the practices of government and its civil servants, of lawyers, doctors 
and churchmen. His particular bête noir was not merely the wastefulness of the networks of 
sinister interests, but also the secrecy and unaccountability of this labyrinthine 
establishment. 
 For many years, Bentham hoped that the government could be persuaded to reform 
itself from within, primarily through its use of reason and good sense. However, the 
continuing failure of the government to adopt his plans for the panopticon in a thorough 
reform of the penal system led him to see the British government as an irredeemably 
corrupt institution, which existed solely to serve the sinister interests of its members against 
the good of society. Even after his loss of faith in the possibility of benevolent despotism 
which occurred in the early years of the nineteenth-century, Bentham did not restrict his 
contempt to the wealthy and well-placed. The oppressed and exploited were complicit in 
the system’s survival. He was emphatic that, as he wrote in the 1816 “Advertisement” for 
his paper “Defence of Economy against the Right Honourable Edmund Burke”, “submission 
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and obedience on the one part, are the materials of which power on the other part is 
composed” (Bentham 1993, p.45). It was only by the use of force, “if by anything,” Bentham 
wrote, “that such of them whose teeth are in our bowels, will be prevailed upon to quit 
their hold.” (Bentham 1993, p.45) The type of force that Bentham favoured most in Britain 
was generated by the interaction of hedonistic utilitarian constitutional principles, radical 
democratic structures, and open government (for example, Bentham 1990, sections 1-17). 
Hence, he was very happy to work with liberal governments that came to power across the 
world through the violent overthrow of a preceding oppressive government, such as 
happened in Greece, Tripoli and various Latin American revolutions of the 1810s and 1820s. 
 Bentham expounded his constitutional principles most clearly in his unfinished, 
posthumously-published book, Constitutional Code, Volume 1 (hereafter, Code), a work 
which he intended “for the use of All Nations and All Governments professing Liberal 
Opinions” (Bentham 1983b, pp.136-37 [VII.2], and p.xin1). He argued that “the all-
comprehensive, and only right and proper end of Government” was the “greatest happiness 
principle”: in other words, the ultimate aim which the government should seek was “the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number of the members of the community”. The myth 
has grown up that Bentham believed it was possible to measure utility precisely and to 
calculate which of the available options would lead to the best outcome. In fact, he did not 
make this highly implausible claim. He did dedicate the short fourth chapter of his early 
book An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation to considering “Value of a 
Lot of Pleasure or Pain, How to be Measured”, and in that he considered the factors 
affecting the “value” of any particular feeling of pleasure or pain (its “intensity”, “duration”, 
“certainty”, “propinquity” (or proximity), “fecundity”, “purity” and “extent”). Moreover, he 
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did not argue that this calculus relied on precise numerical measures of pleasure and pain. 
He was sceptical regarding the possibility of quantification, invoking ordinal measures 
instead. 
 In fact, Bentham was an indirect or rule utilitarian. He believed the “greatest 
happiness principle” was too vague to serve as a precise guide to political action. For this 
reason, he argued that the government should aim to serve a number of more concrete 
aims, he called “the specific and direct [sub-]ends of Government”. He organized these into 
“positive” and “negative” goals. By “Positive Ends”, he meant the “maximization of 
subsistence, [and] abundance, [as well as] security against evil in every shape” and the 
maximization of equality (equality added at Bentham 1983b, p.137 [VII.2]). In other words, 
the government should aim to create and sustain conditions under which its citizens can 
both meet their needs for physical survival and prosper. By “the all-comprehensive negative 
and collateral [sub-]end of Government”, Bentham meant “the avoidance or minimization 
of expense in every shape”. Obviously, this negative end was particularly significant given 
Bentham’s hatred of the abuse of government posts to feed the sinister interests of office-
holders such as politicians, civil servants and indeed anyone whose private finances and 
reputation benefited directly from the state. 
 The other key elements of Bentham’s constitutional scheme concerned the structure 
of the democratic system. Specifically, he argued for the introduction of a codified 
constitution, the holding of annual elections for all Members of Parliament, the replacement 
of multi-member constituencies with single-member constituencies, the granting to 
constituents of the power to dismiss their representative at any time, and the introduction 
of a robust separation of powers with the highest parliamentary authority residing in the 
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legislature (Bentham 1838-43, pp.558-59; see also Bentham 1983b, p.48n1, 32 (V.3.1)). He 
argued for the abolishment of both tests of religious or other beliefs for the franchise and 
university degree courses, as well as the abolishment of the House of Lords so as to create a 
unicameral legislature. At his most radical, he even argued for the enfranchisement of 
women (Williford 1975; Sokol 2011). (However, he did not support female suffrage in Code 
(Bentham 1983b, p.29 (V.1.A3).) Moreover, he wished to see the legal and penal systems 
transformed. In opposition to the distorted laws of his own day, he insisted on the need for 
a single, simply-stated system of known laws for everyone and for the universal application 
of trial by jury. He insisted on the importance of clear, simple, cheap and impartially-applied 
legal procedures, for legal cases not to be protracted needlessly, and for convictions to be 
based on solid evidence. Finally, where guilt was established, he insisted on the application 
of punishments that were both proportionate and humane. Through these measures, 
Bentham hoped that the corruption-sodden politics of the early-nineteenth century could 
be replaced by a democratic politics in which reason and humanity would emerge from the 
wills of society’s self-interested citizens. 
  
4. Open government 
It should be no surprise that Bentham was a staunch advocate of open government, given 
his hatred of vested interests and the mists of secrecy and obscurity with which they 
surrounded themselves. Within the first thirty pages of his massive Code, Bentham had 
turned to the vital importance of public opinion as a check on politicians and all other public 
functionaries. Hence, he placed what he called the “Public Opinion Tribunal” at the heart of 
the “Constitutive authority” of the state (see further Kelly 1990 and Cutler 1999). “The 
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sovereignty is in the people. It is reserved by and to them. It is exercised, by the exercise of 
the Constitutive authority” (Bentham 1983b, p.25 (III.A1)). It was the Constitutive authority 
which grounded the authority of the remainder of the state: that is, the legislature, 
executive, civil service and judiciary (Bentham 1983b, pp.26-27 (IV.A1-6)). The Constitutive 
authority was to be made up of “the whole body of the Electors belonging to this state”, a 
group which in Code included all men over the age of 21 who were able to read and who 
were not “Passengers” (by which he appears to mean those who were merely visiting the 
country). The Constitutive authority (and only it) had the ultimate authority to appoint and 
remove politicians and other public functionaries (including but not restricted to the Prime 
Minister, ministers and judges), and to order the trial of any public functionary whom it had 
removed from office for misconduct (Bentham 1983b, pp.30-32 (V.2.A2 and A5)). 
 As Bentham had already noted in an unfinished essay from 1822 entitled “Securities 
against Misrule”, the Public Opinion Tribunal was a fiction, but a useful one (Bentham 1990, 
p.28). Probably, Bentham had in mind that it was not a real tribunal. Indeed, it did not refer 
to an organized body of persons at all. It had no stable membership, no internal structure, 
no constitutive or substantive rules. In fact, as Bentham observed in Code, the Public 
Opinion Tribunal was made up of any one in the world, whether male or female, citizen or 
not, who took an interest in the actions of the various public functionaries who made up the 
formal branches of the state (Bentham, 1983b, p.35 (V.4.A2); Bentham 1983b, p.39 (V.6.A1-
2)). 
 Members of the Public Opinion Tribunal exercised their various powers when they 
monitored, assessed and, where necessary, protested against these actions. Some of its 
members would listen to debates in the various national and lower legislatures, courts and 
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administrative forums; they or others of its members could organize and participate in 
public political meetings or plays with a political subject, as well as speaking or writing on 
political subjects (Bentham 1983b, pp.35-36 (V.4.A3)). Bentham argued that, in this sense, 
this amorphous group could be considered as being made of “so many Committees or 
Subcommittees”. Moreover, its multifaceted deliberations had a quasi-legal function along 
the lines of the common law, in that although its deliberations were not organized centrally, 
still it applied something very like laws to the actions of public functionaries (Bentham 
1983b, p.35 (V.4.A2) Bentham 1983b, p.36 (V.4.A4)). Moreover, it gathered and assessed 
information that was relevant to this task, as well as censoring recalcitrant functionaries. In 
that it expressed itself through the individual votes of the electors, it determined who would 
hold public office (Bentham 1983b, pp.36-39 (V.5)).  
 Ultimately, the sole immediate weapon at the command of the Public Opinion 
Tribunal was publicity. As Bentham wrote in “Securities Against Misrule”: “It is by publicity 
that the Public Opinion Tribunal does whatsoever it does: any further than employment is 
given to his instrument, the workman can not do any thing.” (Bentham 1990, p.28) With this 
in mind, Bentham argued in Code that the constitution should both protect the negative 
conditions of public scrutiny and actively generate the positive conditions. Negatively, the 
government should neither ban nor tax public discussion of political matters (broadly 
conceived), for example as that occurred in newspapers and the like (Bentham 1983b, 
pp.40-41 (V.6.A3)). He did wish to retain the law of defamation “if [the remarks were] 
mendacious or temeracious”, but otherwise he argued that the state should allow complete 
freedom of expression except where issues of national security were at stake (Bentham 
1983b, pp.39-40 (V.6.A2)). (Even when they were at stake, he insisted on the need for 
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careful and independent scrutiny to ensure that security laws were not being used as masks 
for oppressing the Public Opinion Tribunal.) Positively, Bentham’s liberal constitution 
created a legal obligation on all functionaries to generate relevant information needed to 
facilitate the work of the Public Opinion Tribunal (Bentham 1983b, p.37 (V.5.A5)). This 
extended to the question of criminal prosecutions, which were to be held in public with full 
disclosure of evidence, except where matters of the most sensitive nature would be 
compromised by such disclosure (Bentham 1838-43b, pp.369-71). The judge was to decide 
which evidence was of this type, although the strong presumption should be that it was not, 
particularly given the frequent closeness of judges and the administration and the potential 
corruption to which that closeness might lead (Bentham 1838-43b, pp.370-71). Explicitly, 
Bentham rejected the granting of privacy to cases involving popular sedition, civil 
disobedience and the defamation of politicians (Bentham 1838-43b, p.372). 
 The constitution required these functionaries to carry out these tasks initially 
through inspection and investigation. Moreover, Bentham was explicit that such 
investigation was not to be restricted to public or quasi-public institutions, such as state-run 
schools or workhouses: “whatsoever the establishment, institution or foundation, – and 
howsoever private, – in no way can any interest which is not sinister be served, by screening 
it from public inspection, performed through the medium of the authorities hereby for that 
purpose constituted” (Bentham 1983b, p.385 (IX.20.A10)). The powerful were not restricted 
to the government. They included entrepreneurs, lawyers, church officials and medical 
professionals. Now, one might add media moguls, successful musicians and a great many 
other professions. Immediately, this raises questions regarding Bentham’s attitude to the 
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proper limits of investigations into individual affairs and particularly regarding his attitude to 
the legitimate demands of personal privacy. 
 
5. Personal privacy 
Bentham was conscious of the fact that insisting on complete publicity ran the risk of 
exposing the individual to the “tyranny of the majority”, increasing the vulnerability of the 
already powerless (Mill quoting de Tocqueville, in Mill 1993, p.73). In the contemporary 
context of cybercrime and expansive systems of social media complete publicity increases 
the likelihood of identity theft, trolling and the like. Bentham wrote surprisingly little about 
the importance of personal privacy, and what he did write divides scholars. Some scholars 
effectively ignore the question, turning instead to Bentham’s defense of constitutional 
liberties, and particularly the fact that he justified liberties of thought and expression as 
checks on public institutions, as noted in the previous section (for example, Schofield 2006, 
pp.234-40). For scholars such as Douglas Long, this justification gave a very worrying slant to 
Bentham’s beliefs, not merely regarding the proper limits of free expression by individuals 
and groups, but regarding the types of ideas that could be expressed. As we saw in section 
three, Bentham required that public deliberations be conducted using language that 
referred only to real entities or to clearly-understood necessary fictions. Long concludes: 
 
“[Bentham’s] purposes remained manipulative in spite of his endorsement of specific sorts 
of liberty. If he did not see himself as aiming to restrict conscious deliberation, that was 
because his real purpose was to redefine both consciousness and deliberation, and in so 
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doing to define the conscious person in largely “reactive” terms. Only within the boundaries 
established by his science of human nature would it be considered expedient to stimulate 
public discussion and debate.” (Long 1977, p.198)  
 
The Public Opinion Tribunal was to carry out its work using what Bentham saw as the 
appropriate non-fictitious terminology and utilitarian values. He held that to the extent it 
did not do this, criticism would allow irrationality to creep back into their deliberations. To 
the extent that harmful deliberations influenced the public realm, legislation, government 
practice and ultimately the lives of individuals would be corrupted.  
 Many difficulties arise from Bentham’s requirement that public discussions and 
investigations be conducted making reference solely to real entities and necessary but 
clearly-understood fictions. Firstly, even his most concerted attempts to design 
deconstructive techniques whereby social critics could both (i) identify the set of real 
entities and useful fictions, and (ii) distinguish members of this set from fictitious entities 
and harmful fictions, suffered from fatal logical flaws. His failure to criteria by which to 
justify his choice of real entities meant that, ultimately, his deconstructive techniques relied 
upon his largely personal beliefs about the nature of reality (see Tyler 2004; also Tyler 
2003). Secondly, Bentham held that only specialist censors would have the expertise and 
time to apply his deconstructive techniques (Bentham 1997, p.180). In this second case, he 
argued that other censors could use the set without having been involved in designing and 
justifying them. Yet, he recognized also that these practical censors were in constant danger 
of falling into error because of their relative distance from the work of the more 
philosophical censors. (The terms “practical censors” and “more philosophical censors” are 
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required to capture Bentham’s meaning, even though he did not use the terms himself.) The 
implication was that the practical censors would be required to consult the more 
philosophical censors regarding the criteria to be used, a requirement that would give a 
great deal of practical power and responsibility to the more philosophical censors. This 
division of tasks might be ameliorated to some degree by Bentham’s aspiration to teach the 
principles of censorial utilitarianism to the general population, in that some citizens might 
show some philosophical talent (Bentham 1970, pp.243-46; Bentham 1983a). Yet, he seems 
to have thought that, generally, competent philosophical censors would be in agreement 
regarding the sets of real entities and useful fictions, and would agree on the reforms 
required by changing circumstances. In other words, Bentham had a great faith in the unity 
of conclusions that accompanied the exercise of enlightened judgment. 
 It was partly because of his naïve faith that, in D.J. Manning’s words, Bentham did 
“not seem to have considered it necessary to prepare a defence of individualism or of 
privacy.” (Manning 1968, p.88) Yet, it is important to be careful here, because this does not 
mean that Bentham thought privacy to be unimportant. Firstly, as Fred Rosen noted, even 
though Bentham used the word “privacy” rarely, that was largely because he conceived of 
the issue as how the law would best maintain “security”. By the latter word, Bentham seems 
to have meant, as Rosen put it, “the imposition on some not to interfere in the lives of 
others.” (Rosen 1983, p.72) Such imperatives applied to laws as much as to private actions. 
Rosen placed great emphasis on the fact that Bentham saw law as opposite to liberty, even 
if in practice one needed some laws to maximize liberty overall. Rosen conceded that the 
legitimate “obligations [to maintain security] can be quite considerable. As the government 
acts, for example, to prevent invasion, crime, disease, and calamity.” (Rosen 1983, p.72) 
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Hence, these actions might have required the individual to accept extensive state 
investigation, which would have been “destructive of [the individual’s] dignity.” (Rosen, 
1983, p.72) Nevertheless, Rosen saw Bentham as defending privacy, because, although 
extensive such intervention would be neither “arbitrary” nor “tyrannical”. Rosen concluded 
that “A well-ordered [Benthamite] society, based on rational principles of security, need not 
be a totalitarian one.” (Rosen 1983, p.72) 
 Rosen’s conclusion is unjustified, because obviously while arbitrary rule was indeed 
oppressive, that did not mean that non-arbitrary rule was not authoritarian.2 After all, one 
could strictly enforce a law requiring everyone to attend all government rallies and wave 
supportive banners while singing patriotic songs. The rule would be both non-arbitrary and 
authoritarian. There are more convincing reasons for seeing Bentham as respectful of 
personal dignity. In 1966, Negley praised Bentham for “distinguish[ing] carefully and 
distinctly the area of private, individual action and responsibility from that of political and 
legal liability.” (Negley 1966, pp.321-22) Yet, Bentham was concerned primarily to stave off 
“oppression” of ordinary citizens by public officials, that is, the causing of wrong “to a non-
functionary by a functionary of any grade, by means of the power belonging to him as such” 
(Bentham 1983b, p.390 (IX.21.A2)). The “sole remedy” for oppression was publicity 
(Bentham 1990, pp.27-29). Even though, as noted above, publicity was effective primarily 
through the vigilance of the Public Opinion Tribunal, Bentham identified a number of other 
salient mechanisms. For example, he required that an official “Incidental Complaint-Book” 
be kept to record all official complaints lodged by citizens against public functionaries 
(Bentham 1983b, pp.395-96 (IX.21.A20.6)). Ministers were required to inspect their 
                                                          
2 On the conceptual distinction between “totalitarianism” and “authoritarianism”, see Brooker 2000, 
pp.7-35. 
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departments annually and to pursue any complaints of misconduct that citizens had lodged 
against their functionaries (Bentham 1983b, p.277 (IX.9.A5)). Furthermore, restrictions 
should be placed on the information which the government was allowed to seek. Hence, 
citizens should be required to disclose a particular piece of information only if the cost of 
securing its disclosure was more than off-set by the benefit that the community could 
reasonably be expected to derive from its disclosure. Such costs were partly financial (the 
“expense” of employing the public functionaries, the cost to the citizens of recording the 
information, and so on) and partly non-financial (for example, the “vexation” caused to 
citizens) (Bentham 1983b, p.293 (IX.11.A12)). Moreover, Bentham argued strongly for 
certain constitutional requirements in relation to the collection of information from its 
citizens. For example, the latter were to be notified clearly and in advance of which types of 
information they might be required to give, and this notification must be recorded in the 
relevant nation’s constitutional code (Bentham 1983b, pp.292-93 (IX.11.A12)).  
 Bentham recognized that these protections alone were inadequate. The public 
disclosure of some types of information would almost always cause pain or “vexation” 
without generating a compensating benefit for the community. Hence, he argued that: “The 
demand which the case presents is a demand for prudential care of the individual himself or 
those under whose guardianship his condition in life has placed him, but not for any 
interference on the part of the legislator.” (Bentham 1931, p.477) This passage could have 
been taken directly from J.S. Mill’s On Liberty. The only significant difference between 
Bentham and Mill was that Bentham did not reserve this liberty solely to civilized societies 
in the manner that Mill reserved liberty (Mill 1993, pp.78-79). 
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 Which types of sensitive information or beliefs fall within this realm of privacy? 
Bentham was willing to endorse practices that most people would still regard as 
unthinkable. Indeed, he wrote but did not publish several works on these topics. For 
example, he advocated the legalization of infanticide, concluding that in circumstances such 
as illegitimacy or poverty, “A more normal [practice] can scarce be found.” (Bentham 1931, 
p.479; see also (Bentham 1931, p.486-88 Boralvei 1983, pp.130, 140) Many of his views 
have gained far wider acceptance than this. Hence, in Code he argued that public 
functionaries should not be allowed to enquire into citizens’ religious beliefs, as this would 
be to act as “if the profession of such opinion is regarded and treated as a crime” (Bentham 
1983b, p.292 (IX.11.A11)). Yet, the sensitive topic to which returned more frequently than 
any other over the course of several decades was the legalization of prohibited sexual 
practices between consenting adults, not least male homosexual relationships (see Bentham 
1931, 2013, 2014; Compton 1978a, 1978b; Campos Boralevi 1983, 1984; Sokol 2011). 
Bentham’s position changed very little over time. No sexual practice was “unnatural” or 
“impure”: what was repugnant to one person “to another is most delightful” (Bentham 
1931, pp.495-96). He argued that the very many people who condemned homosexuality 
invoked a “false and spurious morality” which was surrounded by a “cloud of prejudices” 
(Bentham 1931, p.496). His view had definite utilitarian implications: “Applied to field of 
morality and to the field of religion, then it is that nonsense becomes a most productive 
source of cruelty and misery.” (Bentham 1931, p.483) Countering such prejudices would 
tend increase “the mass of pleasure” very significantly (Bentham 1931, pp.495-96). Hence, 
Bentham argued that punishment for sexual deviance between consenting adults was “pure 
evil”, as such sexual deviance brought only pleasure and so was “pure good” (Bentham 
1931, p.491). The evil came from “legal punishment” (homosexuality was punishable by 
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hanging in Britain at this time), “infamy”, “fear of hell torment”, the giving of “false 
evidence” against the innocent, “self-banishment” by homosexuals, fear of legal 
punishment and infamy, “loss of enjoyment” and pain from “the sense of restraint… and 
violence of restraint” (Bentham 1931, p.491). Obviously, the possibility of “false accusation” 
created a powerful “instrument of extortion”, for something that even when committed was 
merely a “matter of taste” (Bentham 1931, p.492). Bentham considered and rejected all 
arguments that consensual sexual deviance was harmful (Bentham 1931, pp.494-95). Its 
legalization was an issue of “truth, public utility and justice”, in which Bentham advocated 
“[a]ll comprehensive liberty” (Bentham 1931, pp.493, 494). 
 It was this type of clash between conventional morality and practices that should the 
law should not prohibit on utilitarian grounds that led Bentham to advocate significant 
safeguards for personal privacy. He did not discuss this matter directly in relation to the 
investigative powers of non-judicial state functionaries. It seems that in part he did not 
discuss it in that regard because he held that the state had a prima facie right to demand 
almost any piece of information which it deemed likely to be pertinent to the well-being of 
the community. Nevertheless, in his Rationale of Judicial Evidence he did consider cases in 
which that prima facie right should be curtailed due to significant utilitarian concerns for the 
well-being of the individual. His primary concern in this part of that book was to determine 
what evidence should be heard in open court and on the public record, and which should be 
heard only by the judge and, depending on the sensitivity of the matter, the other parties 
involved in the case and necessary court officials. Bentham rejected systems of secret courts 
(“there should not anywhere be a single one” of these “seats of despotism” (Bentham 1838-
43b, p.369)). Moreover, he rejected any system where some judges only heard cases in 
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secret: “the sense of responsibility, the habit of salutary self-restraint, formed under the 
discipline of the public school [that is, of open court hearings], will not be suddenly throw 
off in the closet.” (Bentham 1838-43b, p.369) He highlighted nine types of case in which the 
publicity of evidence and court proceedings might be restricted: where citizens might seek 
to disrupt court proceedings; where a witness seeks to make statements maliciously; where 
releasing certain information would expose the source of that information, thus rendering it 
liable to destruction (for example, where naming an informant endangers their life); where 
publicity would harm someone’s economic interests unjustifiably; where making specific 
information public would violate their legitimate privacy; where hearing certain facts would 
corrupt women and children; to preserve state secrets; where publishing evidence would be 
too expensive relative to the benefit generated; and where publishing the documents and 
transcripts would unduly increase the body of evidence (Bentham 1838-43b, pp.360-68). 
 We are concerned primarily with the fifth item on the list. Here, Bentham considered 
cases where “the peace and honour of families is concerned”, by which he might well have 
meant cases involving adultery, sexual deviance and sexual assault, all of which he mentions 
in this chapter of the Rationale of Judicial Evidence (Bentham 1838-43b, p.366). In those 
circumstances, “Publicity … can have no better effect than that of pouring poison into 
whatever wounds have already been sustained.” (Bentham 1838-43b, p.366) Then, the 
judge should do whatever he deemed necessary to maintain the privacy of the relevant 
party, with Bentham’s preference being that the judge would hear sensitive evidence in a 
private room away from the other parties and members of the court. More than this, the 
judge should punish people who disclosed sensitive information with the purpose of 
harming the reputation of the other party: “there seems no reason why malicious vexation 
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in this shape should go unpunished, any more than in any other.” (Bentham 1838-43b, 
p.367) Bentham’s overriding goal was simply “[t]o preserve individuals from unnecessary 
vexation” (Bentham 1838-43b, p.364). Hence, the judge might choose to impose a fine, for 
example, where the malicious party “demand[s] his pound of flesh, his right of tormenting 
his adversary, by dragging into the daylight all those shades in his character, which (for the 
tranquility or reputation of one or both parties, their families, and other connexions) had 
better have remained in darkness.” (Bentham 1838-43b, p.367) 
 Despite his defense of privacy in these instances, Bentham insisted that judicial 
proceedings be kept public except where not doing so was likely to serve the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number (Bentham 1838-43b, p.369). Moreover, even when 
evidence was heard in private, records of the testimony must be kept. Such record-keeping 
helped to ensure that the judge did not exercise “a power completely arbitrary”, and to 
ensure that miscarriages of justice could be identified and rectified, and, conversely, that 
the innocent could be vindicated by subsequent scrutiny of the evidence on the basis of 
which the original judgment had been made (Bentham 1838-43b, pp.369-70). Finally, he 
held that privacy would be justified in a relatively small number of cases only (Bentham 
1838-43b, pp.371-72). This section has shown that Bentham held very liberal views 
regarding some of the intimate aspects of an individual’s life and despite famous allegations 
to the contrary, he placed important restrictions on the handling of sensitive personal 
information. 
 
5. Review and conclusion  
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This article began by noting Bentham’s Foucauldian reputation as an early and fanatical 
advocate of the surveillance state. Yet, hopefully it is clear by now that in reality Bentham 
could not have been further from that stereotype. Bentham had a profound awareness of 
the innumerable harms caused by the abuses of power perpetrated not merely by the 
government, but possibly even more significantly by businesses and other networks of self-
interested actors. Bentham railed against lawyers (“Judge & Co.”), the prison establishment, 
members of the medical profession, the established church and a vast number of other 
sinister interests, of which the government was merely one. All of these groups worked to 
improve their own finances and status, usually at a huge and perpetual cost to the utilitarian 
good of the community. Bentham condemned their abuses with a venom and tenacity that 
exceeded even the most virulent social critic of the day. His attacks were always driven by a 
powerful combination of empirical detail and ethical commitment. Moreover, he 
demonstrated a practical awareness of the power of language and institutional control 
which far exceeded that of his contemporaries and almost all social critics writing today. It is 
particularly ironic therefore that he should now be seen as a strange, Georgian defender of 
institutional oppression.  
 For the last thirty years of his life, Bentham showed an overriding faith in the ability 
of the feelings of self-interest and the reason of each citizen to counter these abuses. As he 
wrote in Code, “Tyranny would be banished from the earth, could it but once be sufficiently 
known” (Bentham 1983b, p.386 (IX.20.A12)). Sectional interests would be rendered inert 
once citizens realized how their own self-interest was being subverted. Citizens could 
achieve this realization only to the extent that, by examining the subterfuges and abuses of 
the powerful, they functioned as a Public Opinion Tribunal. He placed intense trust in this 
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tribunal (Bentham 1983b, p.36 (IV.4.A4)). Hence, Bentham would have championed social 
media passionately had he been alive today. 
 Certainly, there are times when Bentham’s faith in the utilitarian benefits of publicity 
was such that he did seem almost to believe that all should surveil and be surveilled, as 
Foucault alleged. Yet, as his writings on sexual freedom, religion and judicial evidence 
indicate, Bentham was a staunch defender of privacy in many areas of the individual’s life. 
He could not have accepted Foucault’s defeatist (and ultimately conservative) claim that as 
all discourses embody power, it is impossible for individuals to escape to a non-constraining 
environment. Instead, Bentham appealed to what he saw as the natural basis of all human 
good: pleasure and the absence of pain. Rather than endorsing Foucault’s claim that all 
“natural” concepts were merely examples of biopower, Bentham argued that the truth 
could be exposed through linguistic deconstruction. Throughout, he insisted that while 
“[u]nder a government of Laws… the motto of the good citizen” was “To obey punctually”, it 
was at least as important “to censure freely.” (Bentham 1948, p.10) In short, he believed 
that rational investigation would lead all citizens to the same conclusions, including the 
same attitudes towards the appropriate areas of state intervention. 
 Yet, as with all other champions of radical democracy and social media, the most 
serious challenge that Bentham faces is whether his deconstructive methods could address 
the allegation which Herbert Marcuse leveled against Mill: that the elites running “liberal” 
societies can allow extensive freedom of expression and discussion because the dominant 
assumptions and beliefs of those societies are so oppressive that radical views will be taken 
seriously only by an inconsequential section of the population (Marcuse 1969a). In short, is 
Benthamic deconstruction sufficient to enable the Public Opinion Tribunal to escape what is, 
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in Marcuse’s words, a “socially engineered arrest of consciousness”? (Marcuse 1969b, p.16) 
I have argued above and elsewhere that, sadly, it is not (Tyler 2003, 2004). Marcuse’s 
method of regaining a free connection with one’s instinctive nature was political re-
education and the violent suppression of right-wing views, no matter how sincerely held 
(Marcuse 1969a, pp.122-37). If one does not wish to embrace that alternative, then one 
seems to left with something like Bentham’s constitutional proposals. 
 Whether or not Bentham’s belief in the power of reason seems too naïve in an age 
of corporate control of governments and media, ultimately he is not open to Foucault’s 
criticism. Bentham’s writings on open government and publicity were profoundly significant 
in his own day precisely as the most extreme proposals then-current for the creation of an 
independent, critical and very well-informed civil society, to act as a powerful check on 
public functionaries and private institutions. Ultimately, Bentham’s was an especially radical 
position in an age of profound deference in which the vast majority of the population 
accepted social hierarchy, exclusion and corruption as cornerstones of many nations, not 
least the United Kingdom. He held that only with complete freedom of press, discussion and 
association could the Public Opinion Tribunal shed the light of publicity into the otherwise 
dark corners of the state and the sinister interests which dominate civil society, thereby 
violating the greatest happiness principle. For these reasons, it is almost impossible to 
imagine anyone who would have welcomed Wikileaks, Edward Snowdon’s revelations and 
the Panama Papers more fervently than the octogenarian Jeremy Bentham. 
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